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Introduction:  
Scientific Explanation Beyond Causation1 
Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi 
 
What is a scientific explanation? This has been a central question in philosophy of 
science at least since Hempel and Oppenheim’s pivotal attempt at an answer in 
1948 (also known as the covering-law model of explanation; Hempel 1965: 
chapter 10). It is no surprise that this question has retained its place at the heart of 
contemporary philosophy of science, given that it is one of the sciences’ key aims 
to provide explanations of phenomena in the social and natural world around us. 
As philosophers of science, we naturally want to grasp and to explicate what 
exactly scientists are doing and aiming to achieve when they explain something. 
 In his classic Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, Salmon (1989) details 
the shift from Hempel and Oppenheim’s “epoch-making” logical empiricist 
beginnings to a mixture of subsequent perspectives on scientific explanation 
involving ideas concerning causation, laws, theoretical unification, pragmatics, 
and statistics. Although Salmon believes that causal accounts of explanation 
(including his own version) are considerably successful, he ultimately advocated a 
pluralistic outlook. According to his pluralism, different approaches to 
explanation are worth pursuing and they should be understood as complementing 
one another rather than competing with each other. He articulates this pluralism, 
for instance, in his claim about the “peaceful coexistence” of causal and 
unificationist accounts. 2  According to Salmon, the four decades of intense 
philosophical activity on scientific explanation since 1948 did not result in 																																																								
1 Introduction to Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on 
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2 Salmon’s well-known illustration of his pluralism is captured in the story about 
the friendly physicist (Salmon 1989: 183). 
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anything like a consensus, and his prediction was that no broad consensus was 
likely to emerge after 1989, at least not in the short term.  
 However, Salmon’s pluralist outlook and his portrayal of the history of the 
debate (articulated in Four Decades) were largely lost in subsequent philosophical 
work. The two decades following the publication of Salmon’s book in 1989 
became the decades of causal accounts of explanation. As causal accounts came to 
dominate the philosophical scene, this tendency also resulted in establishing a 
research focus on causation itself, and since the late 1980s philosophers have 
made considerable progress in analysing various aspects of causation. For 
example, they have explicated different notions of causation, causal processes, 
causal mechanisms, and causal models, and they have achieved a better 
understanding of the connection between causes and different kinds of 
idealizations, of the link between causation and temporal order, and, indeed, of 
the kinds of explanations that causal information supports. According to causal 
accounts, the sciences explain by identifying the causes of the phenomenon to be 
explained – or, according to the mechanist version of causal accounts, the causal 
mechanisms for that phenomenon (for surveys see Andersen 2014; Woodward 
2014).  
 Causal accounts have been considered to be attractive for several reasons. 
The focus on causal-mechanical aspects of explanation has undoubtedly been in 
many ways a good response to the shortcomings of the covering-law model (and 
of some alternative approaches to explanation). Moreover, the proponents of 
causal accounts have also taken a closer look at detailed case studies of real life 
explanations in the sciences instead of merely analyzing toy examples. The 
proponents of causal accounts have also advanced the field by taking seriously 
case studies from the life and social sciences, freeing the debate from a (formerly) 
widespread physics chauvinism. And, indeed, many paradigmatic explanations in 
the sciences rely on information about causes and mechanisms. Hence, 
philosophers focusing on causal explanation have achieved a great deal by 
studying this aspect of the explanatory practices of science. As a result, today 
hardly anyone denies the explanatory significance and epistemic value of causal-
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mechanistic information provided by the sciences.  
 The domination of the causal accounts has shaped the subsequent debate on 
scientific explanation in several respects: in how arguments have been perceived 
and evaluated; what the criteria for an adequate account of scientific explanation 
have been taken to be (for instance, everybody had to talk about flagpoles, for 
better or worse), and so on. This spirit of a ‘causal hegemony’ can easily be 
detected in extant survey papers (such as Woodward 2014; Craver and Tabery 
2015) 3 , also in influential works advocating a causal approach to scientific 
explanation (for instance, Woodward 2003; Craver 2007; Strevens 2008), and last 
but certainly not least in the tacit presumptions and ‘common knowledge’ one 
encounters at various conferences and workshops.  
 The state of the field after six long decades suggests that something close to 
a consensus was reached: scientific explanation is a matter of providing suitable 
information about causes of the explanandum phenomenon. However, over the 
past decade or so this consensus has come under increasing scrutiny and suspicion 
as philosophers have more widely begun to rethink the hegemony of causal-
mechanist accounts.  
 There are important precedents to this recent development. Indeed, although 
causal accounts did indeed dominate the philosophical scene in the 1990s and the 
2000s, they were far from being the only game in town. From early on, a number 
of authors have drawn attention to non-causal ways of explaining, in particular in 
relation to unificationist accounts (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1984, 1989; 
Bartelborth 1996), pragmatic accounts (van Fraassen 1980, 1989; Achinstein 
1983), analyses of asymptotic explanations in physics (Batterman 2000, 2002), 
statistical and geometrical explanations (Lipton 1991/2004; Nerlich 1979), and 
other specific examples from various scientific disciplines (for instance, Forge 
1980, 1985; Sober 1983; Ruben 1990/2012; Frisch 1998; Hüttemann 2004).      
 Over the past few years, this resistance to the causal hegemony has 																																																								
3  However, Woodward’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
remains open-minded about the possibility of non-causal explanations 
(Woodward 2014: §7.1). 
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burgeoned quickly, and the present volume demonstrates this turning of the tide. 
Looking at the current literature, one particularly striking recent development is 
the increasing interest in the limits of causal accounts of explanation. The guiding 
idea is that although causation is certainly part of the truth about scientific 
explanation, it is unlikely to be the full story. Following this idea, philosophers 
have begun to explore the hypothesis that explanations in science sometimes go 
beyond causation. For instance, there seem to be genuinely non-causal 
explanations whose explanatory resources go ‘beyond causation’ as these 
explanations do not work by way of truthfully representing the causes of the 
phenomenon to be explained. Other scientific explanations go ‘beyond causation’ 
in the sense that their explanatory assumptions do not tell us anything about the 
causal mechanisms involved. In this spirit, a number of philosophers have argued 
that the repertoire of explanatory strategies in the sciences is considerably richer 
than causal accounts suggest. (See Reutlinger forthcoming for a detailed survey of 
the present debate on non-causal explanations.)  
 The motivation for this shift of focus to explanations that go ‘beyond 
causation’ is easy to appreciate: there are plenty of compelling, real-life examples 
of non-causal explanations that causal accounts of explanation seemingly fail to 
capture. To be more precise, the new development in the philosophy of scientific 
explanation is the increasing recognition of interesting and varied examples of 
non-causal explanations of empirical phenomena to be found across the natural 
and social sciences.  
 Unsurprisingly, physics is a fertile ground for such examples, ranging from 
explanations involving symmetries and inter-theoretic relations, to theoretically 
more abstract explanations that rely on, for instance, renormalisation group 
techniques. Moreover, in the more fundamental domains of physical theorizing, it 
seems relatively easy to find explanations that seem non-causal – in the first blush 
at least. Perhaps this does not come as a surprise to those sympathetic to 
increasingly popular skepticism about causation as a fundamental metaphysical 
category in physics (originating in the work of Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell 
among others; see, for instance, Mach 1905; Russell 1912/13; Scheibe 2007: 
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chapter 7). Such causal ‘anti-foundationalism’ is a contested topic in its own right, 
of course, but perhaps the difficulty of interpreting fundamental physics in plain 
causal terms already indicates that explanations in fundamental physics operate in 
terms that go beyond causation (Price 1997; Price and Corry 2007).  
 One need not plunge the depths of fundamental physics to find compelling 
instances of non-causal explanations, however. Various philosophers have 
suggested that there are other kinds of non-causal explanations in the life and 
social sciences, such as mathematical, statistical, computational, network, 
optimality and equilibrium explanations. Moreover, some of the most popular 
examples in the philosophical literature – the present volume included – involve 
rather simple empirical set-ups of strawberries and bridge-crossings. Philosophers’ 
love of toy examples is due to the fact that simple though such examples are, they 
are sufficiently instructive to challenge the philosophy of explanation centered 
around causal accounts, giving rise to fruitful engagement between competing 
philosophical analyses. For instance, what explains the fact that 23 strawberries 
cannot be distributed equally among 3 philosophers (cf. chapter 1)? Is this 
explanation non-causal? Is it non-causal because it is mathematical? Is it 
mathematical in some distinct kind of way (in which familiar mathematized, and 
possibly causal, explanations in science are not)? As the essays in this volume 
demonstrate, thinking carefully about some exceedingly simple cases alongside 
real life scientific explanations is not only fun, but philosophically profitable!4   
 Let us pause for a second. Surely, one might think, the existence of non-
causal explanations is old news. After all, the empirical sciences are not the only 
epistemic project striving for explanations. Proofs in logic and pure mathematics 
are at least sometimes taken to be explanatory – and if so, then proofs explain in a 
non-causal way (see, for instance, Mancosu 2015). In metaphysical debates, too, 																																																								
4 Action or teleological explanations are also often treated as a particular kind of 
non-causal explanations, as, for instance, von Wright (1971, 1974) argues. 
However, the allegedly non-causal character of action explanations is 
(infamously) controversial and has led to an extensive debate (see Davidson 1980 
for a defense of a causal account of action explanations). We will bracket the 
debate on action explanations in this volume.  
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one finds a straightforward appeal to non-causal explanations: for instance, if 
some fact A grounds another fact B, then A is taken to be non-causally 
explanatory of B (see, for instance, Bliss and Trogdon 2016). However, the fact 
that mathematicians, logicians, and metaphysicians sometimes explain in non-
causal terms is an interesting and related topic but it is not the crucial motivation 
for questioning the hegemony of causal-mechanist accounts of explanations in the 
natural and social sciences. 5  But even if non-causal explanations in logic, 
mathematics and metaphysics do not motivate a challenge to causal hegemony in 
philosophy of science, it is certainly worth exploring the relationship between 
non-causal explanations in mathematics, logic and metaphysics, on the one hand, 
and non-causal explanations in the natural and social sciences, on the other hand. 
 Now, what would be an appropriate philosophical reaction to examples of 
non-causal explanations from the natural and social sciences? Let us canvass in 
the abstract three possible ‘big picture’ reactions:  
 
1. causal reductionism,  
2. explanatory pluralism, and  
3. explanatory monism.  
 
First, while some are happy to give up the hegemony of causal accounts of 
explanation and to welcome non-causal ways of explaining empirical phenomena, 
others feel less pressure to do so. Some philosophers – including some featured in 
this volume – take the seeming examples of non-causal explanations to rather 
point to the need for a more sophisticated account of causal explanation. If the 
seemingly non-causal explanations can ultimately be understood as causal 
explanations after all, perhaps non-causal explanations of empirical phenomena 																																																								
5 Although the existence of non-causal explanations internal to, for instance, pure 
mathematics and logic has long been recognized, detailed philosophical accounts 
of such explanations have been under-developed. The dominance of causal 
models of explanation in philosophy of science is partly to be blamed, since much 
of this work did not seemed to be applicable or extendible to domains such as 
mathematics, where the notion of causation obviously does not apply.	
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are indeed rare and exotic (if not wholly non-existent). The attraction of such 
causal reductionism about explanation, if indeed true, lies in the fundamental 
causal unity it finds underlying the prima facie disparate activity of scientific 
explanation. One and the same conceptual framework provides a pleasingly 
unified philosophical theory of explanation, if all explanations in science –
 including alleged examples of non-causal explanations – turn out to ultimately 
function by providing causal information. In other words, causal reductionists 
would like to maintain and to defend the hegemony of causal explanation (see, for 
instance, Lewis 1986; more recently Skow 2014, 2016). 
 Second, one way to deny such causal reductionism is to accept some kind of 
explanatory pluralism. Pluralists adopt, roughly put, the view that causal and non-
causal explanations are different types of explanations that are covered by two (or 
more) distinct theories of explanation.6 The core idea of a pluralist response to the 
existence of examples of causal and non-causal explanations is that causal 
accounts of explanations have to be supplemented with further account(s) of non-
causal explanations (a view Salmon was attracted to, as pointed out above; see 
Salmon 1989; more recently Lange 2016).  
 Third, an alternative to explanatory pluralism is explanatory monism: the 
view that there is one single philosophical account capable of capturing both 
causal and non-causal explanations by virtue of some ‘common core’ that they 
share. To take an analogy, consider the way in which some theories of explanation 
(such as Hempel’s or Woodward’s) account for both deterministic and 
probabilistic (causal) explanations. In an analogous way, a monist holds that one 
theory of explanation may account for both causal and non-causal explanation. 
Unlike the causal reductionist, the monist does not deny the existence of non-
causal explanations. Rather, a monist holds that causal and non-causal 
explanations share a feature that makes them explanatory (for a survey to different 																																																								
6 This notion of explanatory pluralism has to be distinguished from another kind 
of pluralist (or relativist) attitude towards explanations, according to which one 
phenomenon has two (or more) explanations and these explanations are equally 
well suited for accounting for the phenomenon. 
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strategies to articulate monism, see Reutlinger forthcoming).   
 The ‘big picture’ issue emerging from these three reactions is whether 
causal reductionism, explanatory pluralism, or explanatory monism provides the 
best approach to thinking about the similarities and differences between various 
causal and (seemingly) non-causal explanations of empirical phenomena. 
However, this ‘big picture’ question is far from being the only one, and we predict 
that these debates are likely to continue in the foreseeable future due to a number 
of other outstanding questions such as the following ones:  
 
• How can accounts of non-causal explanations overcome the problems 
troubling the covering-law model?  
• What is the best way to distinguish between causal and non-causal 
explanations?  
• Which different types of non-causal explanations can be found in the life and 
social sciences?  
• Can one extend accounts of non-causal explanation in the sciences to non-
causal explanations in other ‘extra-scientific’ domains, such as metaphysics, 
pure mathematics, logic, and perhaps even to explanations in the moral 
domain?  
• What should one make of the special connection that some non-causal 
explanations seem to bear to certain kinds of idealizations?  
• What role does the pragmatics of explanation play in the non-causal case?  
• What are the differences between non-causal and causal explanatory 
reasoning, from a psychological and epistemological perspective?  
• What does understanding amount to in the context of non-causal 
explanations?  
 
Let us now turn to a preview of the volume, which divides into three parts.  
 
PART I addresses issues regarding non-causal explanations from the perspective 
of general philosophy of science. By articulating suitable conceptual frameworks, 
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and by drawing on examples from different scientific disciplines, the 
contributions to this part examine and discuss different notions of non-causal 
explanation and various philosophical accounts of explanation for capturing non-
causal explanations.   
 
Marc Lange presents a view that is part of a larger pluralist picture. For him, 
there is no general theory covering all non-causal explanations, let alone all causal 
and non-causal explanations taken together. But Lange argues that a broad class 
of non-causal explanations works by appealing to constraints, viz. modal facts 
involving a stronger degree of necessity than physical or causal laws. Lange offers 
an account of the order of explanatory priority in explanations by constraint, and 
uses it to distinguish different kinds of such explanations. He illustrates the 
account with paradigmatic examples drawn from the sciences.  
 
Christopher Pincock probes different strategies for spelling out what pluralism –
the view that, roughly put, explanations come in several distinct types – amounts 
to in relation to causal vs. non-causal explanations.  He contrasts ontic vs. 
epistemic versions of pluralism, and he finds room within both versions to make 
sense of explanatory pluralism in relation to three types of explanations: causal, 
abstract, and constitutive types of explanation. Moreover, he also draws attention 
to several problems that explanatory pluralism raises requiring further 
consideration and, thereby, setting a research agenda for philosophers working in 
a pluralist spirit. 
 
Alexander Reutlinger defends a monist approach to non-causal and causal 
explanations: the counterfactual theory of explanation. According to Reutlinger’s 
counterfactual theory, both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by 
virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the 
explanans (illustrated by five examples of non-causal scientific explanations). 
Moreover, he provides a ‘Russellian’ strategy for distinguishing between causal 
and non-causal explanations within the framework of the counterfactual theory of 
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explanation. Reutlinger bases this distinction on ‘Russellian’ criteria that are often 
associated with causal relations (including asymmetry, time asymmetry, and 
distinctness).  
 
Angela Potochnik argues that theories of explanation typically have a rather 
narrow focus on analyzing explanatory dependence relations. However, 
Potochnik argues that there is no good reason for such a narrow focus, because 
there are many other features of explanatory practices that warrant philosophical 
attention, i.e. other features than the causal or non-causal nature of explanatory 
dependence relations. The purpose of Potochnik’s contribution is mainly to 
convey to the reader that it is a serious mistake to ignore these ‘other features’. 
She draws philosophical attention to features of explanations such as the 
connection between explanation and understanding, the psychology of 
explanation, the role of (levels of) representation for scientific explanation, and 
the connection between the aim of explanation and other aims of science. Her 
contribution is a plea for moving the debate beyond causal – and also beyond non-
causal – dependence relations.  
 
Michael Strevens proposes to resist the popular view that some explanations are 
non-causal by virtue of being mathematical explanations. To support his objection, 
Strevens provides a discussion of various explanations that other philosophers 
regard as instances of non-causal qua being mathematical explanations (such as 
equilibrium explanations and statistical explanations). He argues that, at least in 
the context of these examples, the mathematical component of an explanation 
helps scientists to get a better understanding of (or a better grasp on) the relevant 
causal components cited in the explanation. Hence, Strevens’ contribution could 
be read as defending a limited and careful version of causal reductionism. That is, 
at least with respect to the examples discussed, there is no reason to question the 
hegemony of causal accounts. 
 
James Woodward’s contribution displays monist tendencies, as he explores 
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whether and to what extent his well-known version of the counterfactual theory of 
explanation can be extended from its original causal interpretation to certain cases 
of non-causal explanation. Woodward defends the claim that such an extension is 
possible in at least two cases: first, if the relevant explanatory counterfactuals do 
not have an interventionist interpretation, and, second, if the truth of the 
explanatory counterfactuals is supported by conceptual and mathematical facts. 
Finally, he discusses the role of information about irrelevant factors in (non-
causal) scientific explanations.    
 
PART II consists of contributions discussing detailed case studies of non-causal 
explanations from specific scientific disciplines. The case studies under 
discussion range from neuroscience over earth science to physics. The ambition of 
these chapters is to analyse in detail what makes a specific kind of explanation 
from one particular discipline non-causal.  
 
Alisa Bokulich analyses a non-causal explanation from the earth sciences, more 
specifically from aeolian geomorphology (the study of landscapes that are shaped 
predominantly by the wind). Her case study consists in an explanation of regular 
patterns in the formation of sand ripples and dunes in deserts of different regions 
of earth and other planets. Bokulich uses this case study to argue for the “common 
core conception of non-causal explanation” in order to sharpen the concept of the 
non-causal character of an explanation. Moreover, she emphasizes that if one has 
a non-causal explanation for a phenomenon this does not exclude that there is also 
a causal explanation of the same explanandum.  
 
Mazviita Chirimuuta focuses on a case study from neuroscience, efficient coding 
explanation. According to Chirimuuta, one ought to distinguish four types of 
explanations in neuroscience: (a) aetiological explanations, (b) mechanistic 
explanations, (c) non-causal mathematical explanations, and (d) efficient coding 
explanations. Chirimuuta argues that efficient coding explanations are distinct 
from the types (a)-(c) and are an often overlooked kind of explanation whose 
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explanatory resources hinge on the implementation of an abstract coding scheme 
or algorithm. Chirimuuta explores ways in which efficient coding explanation go 
‘beyond causation’ in that they differ from mechanistic and, more broadly, causal 
explanations. The global outlook of Chirimuuta’s chapter is monist in its spirit, as 
she indicates that all four types of explanations – including efficient coding 
explanations – answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions which is at the 
heart of counterfactual theories.  
 
Steven French and Juha Saatsi investigate explanations from physics that turn 
on symmetries. They argue that a counterfactual-dependence account, in the spirit 
of Woodward, naturally accommodates various symmetry explanations, turning 
on either discrete symmetries (e.g. permutation invariance in quantum physics), or 
continuous symmetries (supporting the use of Noether’s theorem). The modal 
terms in which French and Saatsi account for these symmetry explanations throws 
light on the debate regarding the explanatory status of the Pauli exclusion 
principle, for example, and opposes recent analyses of explanations involving 
Noether’s theorem.   
 
Margaret Morrison provides a rigorous analysis of the non-causal character of 
renormalisation group explanations of universality in statistical mechanics. 
Morrison argues that these explanations exemplify structural explanations, 
involving a particular kind of transformation and the determination of ‘fixed 
points’ of these transformations. Moreover, Morrison discusses how 
renormalisation group explanations exhibit important differences to other 
statistical explanations in the context of statistical mechanics that operate by 
“averaging over microphysical details”. Although Morrison does not address the 
issue explicitly, it is clear that she rejects causal reductionism, and it is plausible 
to say that her non-causal characterization of renormalisation group explanations 
is compatible with pluralism and monism.  
 
PART III extends the analysis of non-causal explanations from the natural and 
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social sciences to extra-scientific explanations. More precisely, the contributions 
in this part discuss explanatory proofs in pure mathematics and grounding 
explanations in metaphysics.  
  
Mark Colyvan, John Cusbert, and Kelvin McQueen provide a theory of 
explanatory proofs in pure mathematics (aka intra-mathematical explanations). An 
explanatory proof does not merely show that a theorem is true but also why it is 
true. Colyvan, Cusbert, and McQueen pose the question whether explanatory 
proofs all share some common feature that renders them explanatory. According 
to their view, there is no single feature that makes proofs explanatory. Rather one 
finds at least two types of explanation at work in mathematics: constructive proofs 
(whose explanatory power hinges on dependence relations) and abstract proofs 
(whose explanatory character consists in their unifying power). Constructive and 
abstract proofs are two distinct ‘flavors’ of explanation in pure mathematics 
requiring different philosophical treatment. In other words, Colyvan, Cusbert, and 
McQueen make the case for explanatory pluralism in the domain of pure 
mathematics.  
 
Lina Jansson analyses non-causal grounding explanations in metaphysics. In the 
flourishing literature on grounding, there is large agreement that grounding 
relations are explanatory and that they are explanatory in a non-causal way. But 
what makes grounding relations explanatory? According to some recent 
‘interventionist’ approaches, the answer to this question should begin by assuming 
that grounding is a relation that is closely related to causation and, more precisely, 
that grounding explanations should be given an account in broadly interventionist 
terms (relying on structural equations and directed graphs functioning as of 
representations of grounding relations). If these interventionist approaches were 
successful, they would provide a unified monist framework for ordinary causal 
and grounding explanations. However, Jansson argues that interventionist 
approaches to grounding explanations fail because causal explanations and 
grounding explanations differ with respect to the aptness of the causal models and 
	 14	
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